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ESSAY
PROPENSITY OR STEREOTYPE?:
A MISGUIDED EVIDENCE EXPERIMENT
IN INDIAN COUNTRY
Aviva Orenstein*
In a significant break with traditional evidence rules and policies,
the Federal Rules of Evidence concerning rape and child abuse, Rules
413 and 414, permit the government to admit the accused’s prior sexual
misconduct as evidence of character and propensity.  Although these
rules have been roundly criticized, insufficient attention has been paid to
the fact that in allowing propensity evidence for federal sex offenses (as
opposed to offenses under state law), these rules disproportionately af-
fect one distinct civilian population: Indians.
The de facto concentration of Rules 413–414 cases in Indian Coun-
try raises troubling questions regarding what it means to have just and
neutral evidence rules.  The selective application of these character rules
to a particular population violates important goals of evidence law, such
as equal application, fair process, and focus on the event charged. The
concentration of Indians among criminal defendants subject to Rules
413–414 exposes Indians to rules that allow jurors to convict relying on
the accused’s propensities and prior sex offenses.  This focus on prior
bad acts can be unfair to the accused and distracting for the jury.  It may
also perpetuate stereotypes about Indians, subtly influencing the devel-
opment and application of the rules.
Relying on theories of how fact-finders use stereotypes, this Essay
posits that applying Rules 413–414 to a discrete minority makes the pro-
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for incomparable technical assistance and to Joshua Fix for outstanding research assistance.  I
would also like to thank Elliot Anderson, Dennis Caviston, and Kyle Michael for valuable
help, and to express my gratitude to the editorial staff of the Cornell Journal of Law and
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pensity arguments seem more intuitively appealing, because the appear-
ance of Indians as regulars at the defense table works to reinforce the
perception that propensity evidence is valuable.  Therefore, this Essay
argues, the evidence experiment in Indian Country has helped pave the
way for judicial acceptance of a dangerous new doctrine permitting pro-
pensity evidence in sex offense cases.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1995, Congress enacted new Federal Rules of Evidence specifi-
cally targeting those accused of rape and child molestation.1  Rules
413–414 of the Federal Rules of Evidence allow prior sex offenses by
the accused (whether the prior bad-acts were formally charged or not) to
be admitted for any relevant purpose.2  These rules contravene centuries
of legal tradition by permitting jurors to use such prior offenses to assess
the accused’s character and propensities;3 jurors may use this evidence
circumstantially to reason that the accused is more likely to be guilty of
the crime charged because he committed similar wrongs in the past.
Much has been written—little of it complimentary—on the wisdom
and fairness of Rules 413–414.  Scholars have raised serious concerns
1 See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 § 320935, Pub. L. No.
103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
2 See FED. R. EVID. 413–414.
3 The common law of lustful disposition, however, provided an exception to the ban on
propensity evidence. See generally Lannan v. State, 600 N.E.2d 1334, 1335–38 (Ind. 1992)
(discussing and rejecting the lustful disposition exception); Lisa M. Segal, The Admissibility of
Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in Sex Offense Cases: New Federal Rules of Evidence Codify
the Lustful Disposition Exception, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 515 (1995) (discussing the history
and policy implications in Rhode Island of adopting Rules 413–415, which replaced the com-
mon law of lustful disposition exception).
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about the rules’ fairness and constitutionality.4  Congress passed the new
rules as statutes, in circumvention of the regular rule-making process,5
over the objection of the Judicial Conference and its Advisory Commit-
tees on the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.6
However, insufficient attention has been paid to the fact that al-
lowing propensity evidence disproportionately affects two distinct popu-
lations: soldiers and Indians.7  Rape and child abuse are usually
prosecuted as state crimes; crimes committed on federal property or on
Indian land, however, are prosecuted as federal crimes.8  As a result, al-
4 See, e.g., CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE §§ 5411–16, 5411A–17A (Supp. 2009); James Joseph Duane, The New Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence on Prior Acts of Accused Sex Offenders: A Poorly Drafted Version of a
Very Bad Idea, 157 F.R.D. 95, 114–15 (1994); Margaret C. Livnah, Branding the Sexual
Predator: Constitutional Ramifications of Federal Rules of Evidence 413 Through 415, 44
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 169, 181 (1996) (noting the increased risk of due process violation because
juries may be prejudiced by explicit reference to prior bad sexual acts); Dale A. Nance, Fore-
word: Do We Really Want to Know the Defendant? 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3 (1994) (summa-
rizing various arguments against the sexual propensity rules); Louis M. Natali, Jr. & R.
Stephen Stigall, “Are You Going to Arraign His Whole Life?”: How Sexual Propensity Evi-
dence Violates the Due Process Clause, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1 n.34 (1996); Aviva Orenstein,
No Bad Men!: A Feminist Analysis of Character Evidence in Rape Trials, 49 HASTINGS L.J.
663 (1999) [hereinafter Orenstein, No Bad Men!]; Myrna S. Raeder, American Bar Association
Criminal Justice Section Report to the House of Delegates, reprinted in 22 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 343 (1995); Mark A. Sheft, Federal Rule of Evidence 413: A Dangerous New Frontier, 33
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 57, 82 (1995) (“Rule 413 erodes the presumption of innocence in violation
of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”).
5 Cf. Paul R. Rice & Neals-Erik William Delker, Federal Rules Decisions: A Short
History of Too Little Consequence, 191 F.R.D. 678 (2000) (summarizing the federal rulemak-
ing process and describing particular problems in the process for the Federal Rules of
Evidence).
6 See Eileen A. Scallen, Analyzing “The Politics of [Evidence] Rulemaking,” 53 Has-
tings L.J. 843, 856 (2002) (recounting the opposition of the Judicial Conference to Fed. R.
Evid. 413–414).
7 I have struggled with the nomenclature.  As Paul Gonzales observed, it is galling to be
named Indians “because some explorer was looking for a different country to conquer.”  Paul
Gonzales, Appropriation of Culture, http://www.hanksville.org/sand/stereotypes/gonzales.html
(last visited on Aug. 31, 2009).  I have stuck with the term “Indian” for three reasons. First, it
is what most Indians call themselves.  As Alan Velie explains, “‘Indian’ is still the word that
most Indians use, at least in ‘Indian Country,’ that is, Oklahoma, Montana, New Mexico, and
other states with large Indian populations.  On the ‘rez’—that is among working class Indians
on reservations—‘Indian’ is virtually the only term ever used.  Accordingly, with apologies to
those who object to the term, ‘Indian’ is the word I will use here.”  Alan Velie, Indian Identity
in the Nineties, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 189, 190 (1998).  Second, the crimes all occurred in
the legally cognizable place called “Indian Country,” which is why the federal rules apply at
all.  Third, to the extent that the term “Indian” evokes an image and certain stereotypes, those
reactions may be instructive for understanding the relationship between the disproportionate
representation of Indians in the jurisprudence and the new propensity focus of Rules 413–414.
8 The relevant jurisdictional statute reads:
§ 1153. Offenses committed within Indian country:
(a) Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or
other person any of the following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, kidnap-
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most all of the federal cases interpreting Rules 413–414 apply to events
that transpired in the military or in Indian Country.  Burgeoning jurispru-
dence demonstrates that aside from soldiers,9 the occasional Internet
pornographer,10 a federal prison guard accused of rape,11 or someone
transporting a child across state lines,12 it is predominantly Indians who
are affected by this exception to the traditional propensity rules.13
The impact on Indians was noted by scholars at the time of the
rules’ proposal. The ABA Criminal Rules Committee observed that “as a
practical matter, in federal criminal cases, the effect will be felt in Indian
Territory where what would otherwise be state crimes are prosecuted in
federal court.”14  The report asked, “Other questions of fairness aside,
ping, maiming, a felony under chapter 109A, incest, assault with intent to commit
murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury
(as defined in section 1365 of this title), an assault against an individual who has not
attained the age of 16 years, felony child abuse or neglect, arson, burglary, robbery,
and a felony under section 661 of this title within the Indian country, shall be subject
to the same law and penalties as all other persons committing any of the above
offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.
18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006); see also Duane, supra note 4. R
9 See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 59 M.J. 195 (C.A.A.F. 2003); United States v. Va-
lentin-Nieves, 57 M.J. 691 (N-M. Ct. App. 2002); United States v. Bailey, 55 M.J. 38
(C.A.A.F. 2001); United States v. Wright, 53 M.J. 476 (C.A.A.F. 2000).  The issue of rape in
the military raises special issues of gender relations in the military.  Currently the United
States military is struggling with issues of rape and domestic violence. See, e.g., Michael
Janofsky, Air Force Begins an Inquiry of Ex-Cadets’ Rape Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20,
2003, at A18; Associated Press, Accused Academy Graduates Remain in the Military, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 5, 2003, at A21; Michael Moss, Michael Janofsky & Diana Jean Schemo, Penta-
gon Faces New Questions on Old Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2003, at A26.  There is a
palpable sense in some of the military rape cases that no harm was done—where the women
(often drunk or violating other social fraternization norms) were sexual anyway, and somehow
“asking for it.”  In other words, at least some of the military rape cases construe the event as
romance gone wrong, where everyone, alleged perpetrator and alleged victim alike, is por-
trayed as blameworthy. See, e.g., Parker, 59 M.J. at 198.
10 See, e.g., United States v. Dhingra, 371 F.3d 557 (9th Cir. 2004) (charging defendant
with using the Internet to solicit sex from a minor); United States v.  Angle, 234 F.3d 326 (7th
Cir. 2000).
11 See, e.g., United States v. Akram, No. 97 CR 78, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9894 (N.D.
Ill. July 8, 1997).
12 See, e.g. United States v. Meacham, 115 F.3d 1488 (10th Cir. 1997) (charging defen-
dant with transporting a minor in interstate commerce with intent to engage in sexual inter-
course with her); United States v. Larson, 112 F.3d 600 (2d Cir. 1997) (charging defendant
with transporting a minor from Connecticut to Massachusetts with the intent that the minor
engage in sexual conduct with him); United States v. Mays, No. 8:06-cr-514-T-23MSS, 2007
WL 1839480 (M.D. Fla. June 26, 2007) (charging defendant with molesting a child on an
airplane).
13 See Duane, supra note 4, at 114–15 (“Not surprisingly, therefore, federal sex crime R
prosecutions are disproportionately targeted at Native American defendants.  In the year end-
ing September 30, 1993, for example, Native Americans made up 80% of all defendants con-
victed of sexual abuse crimes in federal court but less than 1% of the country’s population.”)
(citations omitted).
14 Raeder, supra note 4, at 352. R
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should such a significant and controversial rule change be adopted which
will primarily impact Native Americans?”15  Despite the many objec-
tions to Rules 413–414—as well as the policies, goals, and values of
evidence law—the disparate impact on the population of Indian defend-
ants has not received the attention it deserves.
The federal cases applying Rules 413–414 fall into interesting pat-
terns based on the demography of the accused and the specific nature of
the crimes (adult rape vs. child molestation).  What follows are observa-
tions and conjectures about how the case law can be understood when
considered not only from a doctrinal perspective, but also from a larger,
more functional view of outcomes and effects.  In turn, this Essay con-
siders the ramifications of these rules on the justice- and credibility-seek-
ing goals of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
First, the concentration of the practical effects of Rules 413–414 in
Indian Country raises troubling question both of fairness to Indians and
of what it means to have just and neutral evidence rules.  That these
arguably radical rules apply disproportionately to a minority population
that has traditionally suffered from discrimination and maltreatment de-
serves notice and concern.
Second, the concentration of the effects of Rules 413–414 in Indian
Country raises questions about the goals of evidence law other than
truth-seeking.16  Even if the “truth” is that all the Indians charged with
sex crimes are guilty, the de facto selective application and operation of
these character rules may violate other goals of evidence law, such as
equal application,17 fair process, and focus on the event charged.
Third, this Essay examines how this concentration of Indians as ac-
cuseds subject to Rules 413–414 may have subtly affected the accept-
ance of the new evidence rules.  Relying on theories of how fact-finders
use stereotypes, this Essay posits that applying Rules 413–414 to one
discrete population makes the propensity arguments underlying those
Rules seem more intuitively appealing.  It concludes by arguing that the
application of these rules in Indian Country arguably paved the way for
the rules’ acceptance, despite their historical deviation from traditional
evidence jurisprudence.
15 Id.
16 See generally Symposium, Truth and Its Rivals: Evidence Reform and the Goals of
Evidence Law, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 289 (1998).
17 Here a loose analogy can be drawn to the difference in federal sentencing between
crack and powder cocaine.  By statutory design, federal sentencing for crack cocaine used in
inner-cities has historically been much harsher than the punishment meted out for powdered
cocaine, a drug of choice for wealthy suburbanites. See William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice,
121 HARV. L. REV.  1969, 2008 n.178 (2008) (“[P]ossession of one gram of crack cocaine is
punished as severely as possession of one hundred grams of cocaine powder.”) (citing David
A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283 (1995)).
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I. RULES 413–414: SPECIAL CHARACTER RULES FOR THOSE
ACCUSED OF SEX CRIMES
Federal Rules of Evidence 413–414 allow evidence of the accused’s
prior sex offenses to be admitted in federal sex-crime prosecutions.18
The two rules are identical except that Rule 413 applies to rape, while
Rule 414 applies to child molestation; the case law does not differentiate
between them, and law developed for one rule applies to the other.19
These rules declare that evidence of the accused’s prior similar wrongful
sex acts in rape and child molestation cases “is admissible, and may be
considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.”20  The
accused need not take the stand for his prior bad sex acts to be admitted;
these prior bad acts are admissible in the prosecutor’s case-in-chief, al-
though the prosecutor must give advance notice of his intent to admit
such evidence.21  Rules 413–414 override the general prohibition on pro-
pensity evidence and allow the use of evidence of the accused’s past acts
to argue that the accused has the propensities and character of a sex of-
fender and is therefore more likely to have committed the crime
charged.22
18 See FED. R. EVID. 413–414.
19 See, e.g., United States v. Dewrell, 55 M.J. 131, 138 n.4 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (“As Rules
413 and 414 are essentially the same in substance, the analysis for proper admission of evi-
dence under either should be the same.”).
20 FED. R. EVID. 413–414. Both rules were adopted by Congress as part of the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796
(1994).  Contrary to the hopes of the Rules’ proponents, however, their adoption by states has
not been rapid, though it is still significant. See 140 CONG. REC. S10,276 (daily ed. Aug. 2,
1994) (statement of Sen. Dole) (noting the “leadership role” of the Federal Rules and observ-
ing that once the new rules were adopted “it’s possible—perhaps even likely—that the States
may follow suit and amend their own rules of evidence as well”). Some states have adopted
rules very similar or identical to Rules 413–414.  These states also rely on the federal cases to
interpret the state rules, although sometimes with interesting variations. See FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 90.404 (West 1999); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/115-7.3 (West 1998) (child molestation);
Ariz. Rev. Stat. ANN. § 13-1420 (2008).  For a complete review of state adoptions, see Joyce
R. Lombardi, Comment, Because Sex Crimes are Different:  Why Maryland Should (Care-
fully) Adopt the Contested Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414 That Permit Propensity
Evidence of A Criminal Defendant’s Other Sex Offenses, 34 U. BALT. L. REV. 103, 116 (re-
viewing adoption in the states, but misstating the law in Indiana where the Supreme Court of
Indiana has refused to adopt a version of Rule 414 despite legislative action).
21 See FED. R. EVID. 413(a)–(c), 414(a)–(c).
22 See id. 413–414; United States v. Hawpetoss, 478 F.3d 820, 823 (7th Cir. 2007)
(“[Rules 413–414] create an exception to the general prohibition against ‘propensity evidence’
found in Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) (evidence of other crimes may not be used to ‘prove
the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.’)”). The rules do not
admit all character evidence or all arguably relevant specific wrongs, but are limited instead to
evidence of prior sex offenses similar to those with which the accused is charged.  The rules
also include a notice requirement—the prosecutor must disclose, in advance, any evidence of
the uncharged offenses to the defendant, including statements of witnesses or a summary of
the substance of any testimony that will be offered.
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The accused’s prior sex offense need not have been the subject of a
conviction.23  Jurors need only reasonably believe that a prior bad sex act
occurred.24  Prior bad acts that occurred twenty to thirty years earlier are
regularly admitted as evidence against the accused to show his propen-
sity to commit similar sexual offenses.25
Despite the command that evidence of the accused’s commission of
another sex offense “is admissible,” Rules 413–414 require an additional
step of judicial balancing under Rule 403,26 whereby the trial judge may
exclude the evidence if its “probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.”27  The application of Rule 403 is
highly discretionary.  Elsewhere, I have argued that in the context of
Rules 413–414, Rule 403 has been transformed into “403-lite” and actu-
23 See United States v. Fitzgerald, No. 02-4978, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 23326, at *86
(4th Cir. Nov. 17, 2003) (“The defendant does not have to have been convicted of, or even
charged with, the prior act.”).
24 This standard, that the jury could reasonably find by a preponderance of the evidence
that the other acts had occurred, derives from Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690
(1988), and is regularly applied in Rule 413–414 cases. See United States v. Norris, 428 F.3d
907, 913–14 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The Supreme Court’s decision in Huddleston controls the stan-
dard of proof required to admit evidence under Rules 413–415 . . . ‘[T]he court simply exam-
ines all the evidence in the case and decides whether the jury could reasonably find the
conditional fact . . . by a preponderance of the evidence.’”) (quoting Huddleston, 485 U.S. at
690); United States v. Schroder, 65 M.J. 49, 54 n.2 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (stating that the military
judge’s instruction to the jury “that ‘the jury could reasonably find . . . by a preponderance of
the evidence’ that the other acts had occurred” did not suggest misapplication of the law).
25 See, e.g., United States v. Benally, 500 F.3d 1085 (10th Cir. 2007) (affirming admis-
sion of rape of sister-in-law forty years before charged offense under Rule 414); United States
v. Drewry, 365 F.3d 957, 960 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding “[s]ufficient factual similarity” be-
tween twenty-five-year-old uncharged child molestation and the charged offense permitted
admission of evidence “that might otherwise be inadmissible due to staleness”); United States
v. Gabe, 237 F.3d 954, 959–60 (8th Cir. 2001) (upholding admission of sexual molestation
committed twenty years before charged offenses where prior acts were “almost identical” to
charged crimes).
26 See United States v. Crawford, 413 F.3d 873, 875 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Evidence admitted
under Rule 413 is still subject to Rule 403.”).  There is actually some disagreement among the
circuits about the method of applying Rule 403.  As the court in United States v. Kelly, 510
F.3d 433 (4th Cir. 2007), observed, “There is a circuit split on whether a district court must
address these or other specific factors and make findings.  The Ninth Circuit requires this,
whereas the Seventh Circuit adopts a more flexible approach and does not dictate a specific
analysis.” Id. at 437 n.3 (comparing United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1027–28 (9th
Cir. 2001), with Hawpetoss, 478 F.3d at 825–26).
27 FED. R. EVID. 403.  The Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 403 defines unfair
prejudice as “an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though
not necessarily, an emotional one.” FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s note; see also
Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997) (“The term ‘unfair prejudice,’ as to a
criminal defendant, speaks to the capacity of some concededly relevant evidence to lure the
factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense
charged.”).
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ally provides little real protection to the accused.28  Rather than scruti-
nize the individual facts of the cases, courts rely on the rules’ legislative
history to deem the probative value of the evidence high,29 and denigrate
any unfair prejudice as merely the dangers inherent in propensity evi-
dence that are built into the rules’ design.30  As the court in United States
v. Withorn observed, “The district court was obligated to take into ac-
count Congress’s policy judgment that Rule 413 was ‘justified by the
distinctive characteristics of the cases it will affect,’ and that Rule 414
evidence is ‘exceptionally probative’ of a defendant’s sexual interest in
children.”31 Courts have forsaken the traditional, discretionary gate-
keeping role of Rule 403 and substituted a “presumption of admissibil-
ity.”32  The toothless application of Rule 403 analysis in this context is
all the more ironic because only the individual balancing provided by the
Rule guarantees the constitutionality of Rules 413–414.33
A. Constitutional Challenges to Rules 413–414
Courts have rejected various constitutional challenges to Rules
413–414.  Despite the historical ban on propensity evidence, all courts
that have considered the question have determined that Rules 413–414
do not violate due process.  In United States v. Enjady, for example, the
28 Aviva Orenstein, Deviance, Due Process, and the False Promise of Federal Rule of
Evidence 403, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1487 (2005) [hereinafter Orenstein, Deviance, Due Pro-
cess].  Where the trial court fails to conduct a Rule 403 balancing test at all, however, the
conviction will be reversed. See United States v. Velarde, 214 F.3d 1204, 1212 (10th Cir.
2000).
29 See Benally, 500 F.3d at 1090 (“Consistent with congressional intent regarding the
admission of evidence tending to show the defendant’s propensity to commit sexual assault or
child molestation, ‘courts are to “liberally” admit evidence of prior uncharged sex offenses.’”)
(quoting United States v. Meacham, 115 F.3d 1488, 1492 (10th Cir.1997)); United States v.
LeCompte, 131 F.3d 767, 769 (8th Cir. 1997) (describing the “strong legislative judgment that
evidence of prior sexual offenses should ordinarily be admissible”).
30 See United States v. Horn, 523 F.3d 882, 888 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting that the testi-
mony is prejudicial to the accused “for the same reason it is probative—it tends to prove his
propensity to commit sexual assaults on vulnerable female members of his family when
presented with an opportunity to do so undetected”); United States v. Mound, 149 F.3d 799,
802 (8th Cir. 1998) (“There is no evidence that the prior conviction presented any danger of
unfair prejudice beyond that which ‘all propensity evidence in such trials presents,’ but is now
allowed by Rule 413.”) (quoting LeCompte, 131 F.3d at 770); LeCompte, 131 F.3d at 769
(“Rule 403 must be applied to allow Rule 414 its intended effect.”).
31 United States v. Withorn, 204 F.3d 790, 794 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting Mound, 149 F.3d
at 801).
32 See United States v. Larson, 112 F.3d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting congressional
sponsors’ statements that “[t]he presumption is that the evidence admissible pursuant to these
rules is typically relevant and probative, and that its probative value is not outweighed by any
risk of prejudice”).
33 See United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1433 (10th Cir. 1998) (“[W]ithout the
safeguards embodied in Rule 403 we would hold [Rule 413] unconstitutional.”). See gener-
ally, Orenstein, Deviance, Due Process, supra note 28 (discussing the importance of Rule 403 R
as it pertains to the constitutionality of Rules 413 and 414).
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accused argued that “admission of propensity evidence creates the dan-
ger of convicting a defendant because he is a ‘bad person,’ thus denying
him a fair opportunity to defend against the charged crime.”34  The Tenth
Circuit “agree[d] that Rule 413 raises a serious constitutional due process
issue,”35 but ultimately concluded that Rule 413, though a major depar-
ture from the traditional evidentiary protections offered to the accused,
does not violate due process.36  The court explained that the due process
standard will only be violated when “‘fundamental conceptions of justice
which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions’” are violated
in contravention of “‘fundamental fairness.’”37  In rejecting the due pro-
cess argument, the court observed “[t]hat the practice is ancient does not
mean it is embodied in the Constitution.”38
In addition, accuseds have challenged Rules 413–414 on equal pro-
tection grounds.  One version of the equal-protection argument is that the
rules treat sex offenders differently from those accused of other crimes.39
As sexual offenders are not a suspect class and discriminating against
their particular crimes seems rational, such equal-protection arguments
have been essentially laughed out of court.40
Another more persuasive variation of the equal protection argument
arises from the fact that because rape and child molestation are federal
crimes in only certain jurisdictions, the new rules have a disproportionate
effect on Indians (who, unlike military personnel, did not enlist for their
special jurisdiction).  For instance, in United States v. LeMay, the defen-
dant argued before the Ninth Circuit that Rule 414 has a far greater im-
pact on Indians because they are far more likely than members of other
34 Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1430 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Michelson v. United States, 335
U.S. 469, 475–76 (1948)); see also D. Craig Lewis, Proof and Prejudice: A Constitutional
Challenge to the Treatment of Prejudicial Evidence in Federal Criminal Cases, 64 WASH. L.
REV. 289, 326 (1989) (describing “diminished regret about possible error in a determination of
guilt when the fact finder learns that the accused is an evil person”).
35 Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1430.
36 See id. at 1433.
37 Id. at 1430 (quoting Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352–53 (1990)).
38 Id. at 1432.
39 See United States v. Julian, 427 F.3d 471, 487 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Based on the special
treatment that Rule 413 accords to prior sexual assault offenses in prosecutions charging a
defendant with sexual assault, Julian suggests that the rule deprives him of equal protection of
the law.”).
40 See, e.g., id. (“[T]he more sweeping rule of admissibility that [Rule 413] creates for a
defendant’s prior acts in cases involving sexual assault does not violate equal protection prin-
ciples so long as the rule has a rational basis.”); United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1435
(10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Mound, 149 F.3d 799, 801 (8th Cir. 1998), (“Because Rule
413 does not ‘burden[ ] a fundamental right,’ and because sex-offense defendants are not a
‘suspect class,’ we must ‘“uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational
relation to some legitimate end . . . . Promoting the effective prosecution of sex offenses is a
legitimate end.”) (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996)).
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races to be prosecuted federally for child molestation.41  The court ac-
knowledged that such disproportion might exist—it seems incontrovert-
ible—but viewed that disproportion merely as a quirk of federal
jurisdiction.42  The LeMay court noted that no evidence existed of any
congressional intent to discriminate, and thus dismissed the claim as
meritless.43
Concededly, under current constitutional doctrine, Indians cannot
argue lack of equal protection because there is no intent to discriminate
against them; the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts simply
has that effect.44  Additionally, because of the special political status of
Indian Nations, the equal-protection doctrine has often not been applied
to Indians, and their exemption from equal protection jurisprudence has
often inured to their benefit.45  This does not, however, mean that the de
facto targeting of accuseds in Indian Country is good policy, fair process,
or good for the development of evidence doctrine.
B. Overview of the Case Law
Since the passage of Rules 413–414 there have been approximately
one hundred twenty cases implicating these Rules in federal court.  Of
these, approximately sixty arose in Indian Country, and approximately
thirty in military cases.46  Non-military Rules 413–414 cases are concen-
trated in Indian Country, and tend to cluster in the Eighth and Tenth
Circuits.  After some initial reversals on appeal because the trial court
failed to follow proper procedures, only a handful of the published and
41 United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001).  The accused argued
that Rule 414 “has a far greater impact on Native Americans because they are far more likely
than members of other races to be prosecuted federally for child molestation.  LeMay may be
correct that a disproportionately large number of federal child molestation prosecutions in-
volve Indian defendants.  But this disproportion, if true, would arise simply because the federal
government only has jurisdiction over crimes such as child molestation when they arise on
Indian Reservations, military bases, or other federal enclaves.” Id.
42 See id.
43 See id. (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (requiring discrimina-
tory intent, not just effect, to show violation of equal protection)).
44 See id.
45 Cf. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 537–38 (1974) (upholding congressional em-
ployment preference for qualified Indians under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, deter-
mining that preferences for Indians did not constitute “invidious racial discrimination” and
observing that the Constitution itself allows Congress to regulate commerce with Indian tribes
thereby permitting separate federal legislation with respect to Indians); Kahawaiolaa v. Nor-
ton, 386 F.3d 1271, 1277–78 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that membership in a tribe is a political
and not a racial classification, and hence not subject to “suspect class” analysis, but only a
rational basis test).”
46 The rest arose in other federal territories, or involved government officials acting
under color of state law, child pornography on the internet, human trafficking, and interstate
travel. See United States v. Hawpetoss, 478 F.3d 820, 825 (7th Cir. 2007), (mentioning “the
relative paucity of case law in this area”).
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unpublished cases have held that the sexual propensity evidence was
inadmissible.47
Overwhelmingly, the trial courts admit prior sex offenses under
Rules 413–414, and the appellate courts approve.  The standard of re-
view is abuse of discretion, which, in part, explains deference to the trial
judges in close cases.48  Furthermore, the appellate courts generally do
not see the questions raised by Rules 413–414 as close so long as the
district court applied the correct standards and engaged in Rule 403 bal-
ancing.49  The appellate courts tend to praise the trial judge and dismiss
the accused’s objections as frivolous, intimating that the accused simply
does not understand the changes wrought by Rules 413–414.50
47 Research uncovered only four such cases. See United States v. Begay, No. 08-2149,
2009 WL 301828, at **2–6 (10th Cir. Feb. 9, 2009) (affirming trial court’s rejection of prior
uncharged conduct under Rule 403 for potential confusion and unfairness); United States v.
Dillon, 532 F.3d 379, 389–91 (5th Cir. 2008) (rejecting prior sex offenses under Rule 413 as
being too prejudicial and dissimilar from the crime charged); United States v. Guardia, 135
F.3d 1326, 1327, 1332 (10th Cir. 1998) (in a non-Indian case, the Tenth Circuit sustained the
trial court’s exclusion under Rule 403, and the court excluded evidence of prior “improper
touching” and “suggestive comments” made to other patients by a physician on a military
base); United States v. Papakee, No. 06-CR-162-1-LRR, 2007 WL 1058471, at **3–4 (N.D.
Iowa Apr. 5, 2007) (finding that evidence failed the Rule 403 balancing test because the proba-
tive value of a dissimilar sex offense twelve years earlier was low).  In Papakee, the “court
recognize[d] that Rule 413 evidence is not often excluded under Rule 403.  This case is the
exception, not the rule.” Papakee, 2007 WL 1058471, at *5; see also United States v. Bentley,
475 F. Supp. 2d 852, 857 n.4 (N.D. Iowa 2007) (“It appears that the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals has never reversed a district court for admitting Rule 414 evidence over a Rule 403
objection.”).
48 See, e.g., United States v. Seymour, 468 F.3d 378, 386 (6th Cir. 2006) (“The district
court clearly outlined its reasons for admitting the prior-assault evidence, and we find that the
admission of this evidence was not an abuse of discretion.”); United States v. Tail, 459 F.3d
854, 858 (8th Cir. 2006) (“We give ‘great deference to the district court’s balancing of the
probative value and the prejudicial impact,’ and we see no abuse of the court’s discretion in
this case.”) (quoting United States v. Looking Cloud, 419 F.3d 781, 785 (8th Cir. 2005)).
49 See, e.g., Hawpetoss, 478 F.3d at 827 (“The district court very carefully considered
the disputed evidence and determined it to be both relevant and non-violative of Federal Rule
of Evidence 403.  We certainly see no abuse of discretion in admitting evidence of Mr.
Hawpetoss’ molestation of both S.C. and M.W.”); United States v. Benally, 500 F.3d 1085,
1092 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Considering the record as a whole, this court sees nothing to suggest
the district court abused its discretion when ruling on the admissibility of Benally’s four prior
victims.  Benally has not presented any argument regarding the application of the Enjady fac-
tors or Guardia considerations that persuades us otherwise.”); Seymour, 468 F.3d at 386
(“Rule 413 was enacted as an exception to the default position set forth in Rule 404(b) that
propensity evidence is presumptively more prejudicial than probative.  The district court
clearly outlined its reasons for admitting the prior-assault evidence, and we find that the ad-
mission of this evidence was not an abuse of discretion.”); United States v. Benais, 460 F.3d
1059, 1063 (8th Cir. 2006) (“The evidence was probative and the only prejudice was that
prejudice made admissible by Rule 413.  There was no unfair prejudice as required for exclu-
sion under Rule 403.”)
50 One notable exception is Judge Morris Arnold’s dissent to the denial of rehearing en
banc in United States v. Mound, 157 F.3d 1153, 1153 (8th Cir. 1998).  Judge Arnold argued
that the full court needed to look carefully at the constitutionality of the new rules, observing
that:
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II. THE EFFECTS OF RULES 413–414 ON INDIANS
A. The Unfairness of Harsher Rules
Indians are often identifiable from the accused’s names, which be-
come the case moniker: Medicine Horn, Sioux, Bear Stops, Fool Bull,
Eagle, etc.51  In fact, to establish federal jurisdiction, the court often af-
firmatively locates the crime in Indian Country and highlights the ac-
cused’s membership in an Indian Nation.52  There is no equivalent for
state-based cases where the racial, ethnic, or national identity of the ac-
cused appears prominently as a regular feature of the procedural history.
It would be hard to imagine the relevance of identifying an accused rapist
as African-American, of Mexican descent, or of Albanian lineage.  How-
ever, sentences describing the accused as “a Native American who lives
on the Menomenee Indian Reservation in Wisconsin,”53  or as “a mem-
Fed. R. Evid. 413 runs counter to a centuries-old legal tradition that views propensity
evidence with a particularly skeptical eye.  The common law, of course, is not em-
bodied in the Constitution, but the fact that a rule has recommended itself to genera-
tions of lawyers and judges is at least some indication that it embodies fundamental
conceptions of justice.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Furthermore, he wrote:
It also cannot be irrelevant that the members of two committees, consisting of 40
persons in all, and appointed by the Judicial Conference of the United States to
examine Fed. R .Evid. 413 before its passage, all but unanimously urged that Con-
gress not adopt the rule because of deep concerns about its fundamental fairness.
Id.
51 See, e.g., United States v. Medicine Horn, 447 F.3d 620 (8th Cir. 2006); United States
v. Sioux, 362 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 2004); Bear Stops v. United States, 339 F.3d 777 (8th Cir.
2003): United States v. Fool Bull, 32 F. App’x 778 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v. Eagle, 137
F.3d 1011 (8th Cir. 1998).  The Indian Country cases also involve victims with clearly identifi-
able Indian names such as Shannon Cloud. See, e.g., United States v. Gabe, 237 F.3d 954 (8th
Cir. 2001). But see United States v. Stamper, 106 F. App’x 833, 834 (4th Cir. 2004) (ac-
cused’s name is not recognizably Indian and the only hint of an Indian connection comes in
reference to the jurisdictional statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006), which begins “Any Indian”).
52 See, e.g., U.S. v. Bahe, 40 F.Supp.2d 1302, 1303 (D. N.M. 1998) (accused charged
“with aggravated sexual abuse of a child who had not attained the age of twelve years, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c), said offense alleged to have been committed in Indian Coun-
try, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1153”).
53 United States v. Hawpetoss, 478 F.3d 820, 821 (7th Cir. 2007).  Occasionally courts
will just cite to the statute that provides jurisdiction without mentioning the tribal membership
of the accused or the fact that the crime took place in Indian Country, but this is rare.  Some of
these cases have identifiably Indian names. See, e.g., United States v. Chief, 561 F.3d 846 (8th
Cir. 2009); United States v. Red Eagle, 293 F. App’x 506 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v.
Birdsbill, 97 F. App’x 721 (9th Cir. 2004).  Others could only be identified as involving Indi-
ans because of the jurisdiction. See, e.g., United States v. Granbois, 119 F. App’x 35, 37 (9th
Cir. 2004); Stamper, 106 F. App’x at 834; United States v. Curry, 328 F.3d 970 (8th Cir.
2003); United States v. Tyndall, 263 F.3d 848 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Fred, No. CR
05-801 JB, 2006 WL 4079618 (D. N.M. Dec. 1, 2006); United States v. Benally, No. 2:03-CR-
799 TS, 2006 WL 1493227 (D. Utah May 25, 2006); United States v. Walker, 261 F. Supp. 2d
1154 (D. N.D. 2003).
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ber of the Tohono O’Odham Indian Nation”54 or a “Navajo Medicine
Man,”55 are typical.
Indians should not be the lab rats for a new and arguably dangerous
experiment in character evidence.  Whatever the benefits of Rules
413–414, they clearly disadvantage criminal defendants.  The Rules’ de
facto targeting of Indians is problematic even if this focus reflects an
historical accident or a jurisdictional quirk, and even if the accuseds are
actually guilty of the crimes charged.56  The fact that there are only a
small number of cases simply does not matter.  Even, or perhaps espe-
cially, if the propensity rules were not expanded to the states, the juris-
dictional impact on Indians seems particularly unfair and unseemly.  A
discrete population has become subject to different, harsher rules that are
intended to increase convictions.  That the burden of these Federal Rules
falls on a minority that historically has suffered tremendously at the
hands of the federal government adds to their overall unfairness.57
54 United States v. Norris, 428 F.3d 907, 909 (9th Cir. 2005).
55 United States v. Mann, 145 F.3d 1347, No. 96-2283, 1998 WL 171845, at *1 (10th
Cir. Apr. 13, 1998).
56 The focus on Indians also raises serious issues for teachers of evidence, who must
consider what impression the many Indian defendants encountered in Evidence class make on
law students.  These questions arise not only with Rules 413–414, but with all rules that touch
on sex crimes.  For example, the Supreme Court, in Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150
(1995), applied Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) in a felony sexual abuse on a Navajo
Indian reservation of a four-year-old daughter where the child victim reported “that the ac-
cused ‘gets drunk and he thinks I’m his wife.’” Id. at 154.  Also, the hearsay exception for
statements made for medical diagnosis often involves sex-crime investigations.  See, e.g.,
United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 80–81 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that nine-year-old’s
victim statements to a physician with the Indian Health Service fell within the Rule 803(4)
hearsay exception, and involving witnesses named Jeanne Brave, William Burning Breast, and
Mae Small Bear).
Evidence teachers cannot simply ignore the facts of the cases and hope that the students
simply do not notice, or notice but make no assumptions about Indians and draw no conclu-
sions about the neutrality of evidence law.  As teachers, we have an obligation to acknowledge
the fact that Indians are appearing as criminal defendants—mostly child molesters—with some
regularity in our class discussions.  Such acknowledgment provides an opportunity to review
the jurisdiction of the Federal Rules, teach our students about the growth of evidence law,
ponder the relationship between evidence law and culture, and talk about the subtle effect of
the case method in creating and reinforcing stereotypes. Cf. Ann Althouse, The Lying Woman,
The Devious Prostitute, and Other Stories from the Evidence Casebook, 88 NW. U. L. REV.
914, 916 (1994) (critiquing Evidence casebooks’ portrayal of women, noting that “[r]ather
than inviting professional students to find common humanitarian ground, these stories exacer-
bate prejudices and feelings of exclusion and private pain”).
57 For a summary of the broken promises and other cultural crimes committed against
Native Americans, see Lindsay Glauner, The Need for Accountability and Reparation:
1830–1976 The United States Government’s Role in the Promotion, Implementation, and Exe-
cution of the Crime of Genocide Against Native Americans, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 911 (2002).
American Indians are by most standards the poorest ethnic group in the country and unemploy-
ment rates on reservations are much higher than among any other subgroup of the population.
See Dirk Johnson, Economics Come to Life on Indian Reservations, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1994,
at A1.
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These special sexual propensity rules makes prosecuting Indians ac-
cused of rape or child molestation far easier.  When jurors hear that the
accused committed a prior sex crime similar to the one for which he is
being tried, they will engage in the type of propensity thinking that is
otherwise expressly forbidden by the Evidence Rules.58  This type of evi-
dence thinking has traditionally been considered dangerous because it
tends to be overvalued by the jury.59  What little probative value the evi-
dence might have is magnified, and the unfair prejudice of associating
the accused with similar bad behavior far outweighs the legitimate value
of such evidence.60  The potential unfairness also arises from the fact that
good police work often begins with investigating those with similar prior
crimes.  Investigation methods and decisions to prosecute rely heavily on
this initial police identification, so it is plausible to imagine that many
accuseds will have in their past allegations of similar bad acts, but that
some of those who have a guilty past did not commit the crimes with
which they are currently charged.  Additionally, because we as a society
share a special horror of sex crimes, particularly those committed against
children, an accused with prior sex offenses is likely to prompt juror
hatred and disgust.
In some cases, evidence of the accused’s guilt is overwhelming.
However, there are a few cases where the evidence is sufficiently ques-
tionable that the prior sexual wrongs of the accused seem to make the
difference between a conviction and a not-guilty verdict.  And with harsh
rules like 413–414, it is impossible to know how many accuseds just
accept a plea, convinced that their prior bad acts will deafen the jury to
all claims of innocence no matter how plausible.
For instance, in United States v. Velarde, the accused was convicted
of molesting his girlfriend’s eight-year-old daughter.  Evidence indicated
that the girl felt hostile to the accused because when he visited she was
unable to sleep in her mother’s bedroom, which she was accustomed to
doing because she was afraid to sleep in her own room.61  When the
58 See FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (“Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible
to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.”).
59 See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475–76 (1948).
60 See id.:
Courts that follow the common-law tradition almost unanimously have come to dis-
allow resort by the prosecution to any kind of evidence of a defendant’s evil charac-
ter to establish a probability of his guilt . . . .  The inquiry is not rejected because
character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury and
to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him a
fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge.  The overriding policy of ex-
cluding such evidence, despite its admitted probative value, is the practical experi-
ence that its disallowance tends to prevent confusion of issues, unfair surprise and
undue prejudice. (notes and citations omitted).
61 See United States v. Velarde, 88 F. App’x 339, 340 (10th Cir. 2004).
\\server05\productn\C\CJP\19-1\CJP104.txt unknown Seq: 15 15-JAN-10 15:12
2009] PROPENSITY OR STEREOTYPE? 187
accused visited, the victim slept in an upper bunk bed with her older
brother, where the alleged molestation transpired.62  There was no physi-
cal evidence of sexual abuse.63  The victim testified that Velarde “tried to
stick his private part into [her] private part.”64  Based on the evidence,
the accused could only have been with the child for less than five min-
utes, when according to his version of events, he went to the bathroom
with intestinal distress.65  The witness to the prior sex offense, who testi-
fied about a molestation which occurred approximately twenty years ear-
lier, was Velarde’s sister, with whom he was involved in a property
dispute.66  The evidence pointing to guilt seemed weak given the bias of
the victim, her general fearfulness, the fact that the crime was alleged to
have commenced in a room where her brothers were sleeping, and the
brief time frame available for committing the offense.  One can fairly
conclude this was a case where the alleged prior sex act was crucial in
securing a conviction.
B. The Interaction between Propensity Evidence and Stereotypes
Allowing propensity evidence when the accused is a member of a
disadvantaged and historically despised minority is especially troubling
when it reinforces negative stereotypes about the accused’s group or oth-
erwise serves to distract the jury from the facts of the case at hand.  Pro-
pensity arguments shift the focus from the actual events charged to the
prior history and proclivities of the accused.  Add to that the natural ten-
dency of fact-finders to rely on group stereotypes,67 and the case presents
even more distraction from key events in question, and instead results in
increased attention to the character, habits, and affiliations of the ac-
cused.  The accused thus becomes the sum of his past actions and his
racial or ethnic connections.
Other bad-act evidence is sometimes admitted under Rule 404(b),
when such evidence is introduced for another purpose, such as to prove
62 See id. at 341.
63 See United States v. Velarde, 214 F.3d 1204, 1206–07 (10th Cir. 2000) (the factual
background is described in more detail in the first appeal of the case than in the second).
64 Id. at 1206
65 See United States v. Velarde, 88 F. App’x 339, 341 (10th Cir. 2004).
66 See id. at 341–42.
67 See ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 323 (1999) (“There
is also a great deal of evidence that group stereotypes triggered under conditions that permit
controlled processing can be used in judgments about group members.”); Justin D. Levinson,
Race, Death, and the Complicitous Mind, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 599, 605–07 (2009) (arguing
that stereotypes have a significant impact on how defendants are perceived in criminal trials);
see also United States v. Benally, 560 F.3d 1151, 1152 (10th Cir. 2009) (denying rehearing of
appeal based on Sixth Amendment challenge that foreman of jury acknowledged racial
prejudice against Native American defendant during deliberations).
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intent, knowledge, or absence of mistake.68  Though it exposes jurors to
character-like evidence, Rule 404(b) does not technically operate as an
exception to the rule against character evidence because the other bad
acts are not offered for propensity purposes.69  As a practical matter,
however, the danger of stereotyped thinking is inherent whenever prior-
bad-act evidence is admitted, even for other purposes under Rule 404(b).
Professor Chris Chambers Goodman has expressed concern over the ap-
plication of Rule 404(b), arguing that some forms of 404(b) evidence
expose the jury to negative racial stereotypes.70  Goodman explains how
jurors can use such evidence, even when it is ostensibly admitted only
for non-propensity purposes, to reinforce their belief in the accused’s
guilt.71  To the extent that, for instance, a juror has internalized a nega-
tive stereotype of Latinos as drug dealers, hearing about another drug
deal under Rule 404(b), even if it is offered for some other purpose than
propensity, may tap into the prohibited propensity thinking.72
The unfair prejudice is vastly increased when the evidence is of-
fered with a naked propensity purpose, as occurs with Rules 413–414,
where the jury is positively invited to think in terms of character traits
and tendencies.  It is a small step to include not only the propensity of
sexual misconduct, but the stereotyped propensities of the minority group
in the mix of thinking that “those people” are just “like that.”
The impact of Rules 413–414 on Indians is, therefore, particularly
unfortunate given America’s historical wariness of Indians as dangerous,
drunk, and uncivilized.73  The image of the white settlers’ western trek
includes “circling the wagons” to protect women and children from the
savage Indians.74  America’s western expansion into Indian Territory
68 See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).
69 See id.
70 See Chris Chambers Goodman, The Color of Our Character: Confronting The Racial
Character of Rule 404(b) Evidence, 25 L. & INEQ. 1, 1 (2007).
71 See id. at 1–2, 57.
72 See id. at 26.
73 See Raymond Cross, Essay, American Indian Education: The Terror of History and
the Nation’s Debt to the Indian Peoples, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 941, 945–46, n.20
(1999) (discussing how the “one-dimensional portrayal of the ‘Indian as warrior’ fed into the
popular 19th Century stereotype that the American Indians must be eradicated by the advanc-
ing white civilization as were other dangerous predators such as the wolves, coyotes and
lynx”).
74 See WARD CHURCHILL, FANTASIES OF THE MASTER RACE 232 (City Lights Books
1998) (“We have seen the tipi and the buffalo hunt, the attack on the wagon train and the
ambush of the stagecoach until they are scenes so totally ingrained in the American conscious-
ness as to be synonymous with the very concept of the American Indian.”).  Images of the
dangerous Indian are also common in American film.  For instance in Cattle Queen of Mon-
tana, Ronald Reagan, as “Farrell,” is enlisted to defend the settlers from a band of Indians.
See CATTLE QUEEN OF MONTANA (VCI Entertainment 1955).  Similarly, in Red River (a How-
ard Hawks production starring John Wayne and Montgomery Clift), Indians are portrayed as
savage killers. See RED RIVER (Monterey Productions 1948).  Even the children’s classic book
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was justified in various self-serving and Indian-denigrating ways: from
Manifest Destiny (how great Western culture is) to protection from the
“red devil” (how dangerous Indians are) to a noblesse oblige rationale
that combines the two (how much the savage Indian would benefit from
Western civilizing influences).75  To the extent that part of America’s
treatment of Indians was designed to uplift them from their supposed
childlike savagery and provide them with the benefits of Western culture,
this patronizing function of the “white man’s burden” is reflected in the
special focus on Indians in Rules 413–414.  If the white man is to teach
the Indian about how to be civilized, what better way is there than by
emphasizing rules against rape and the ban on incest, one of Western
culture’s great civilizing taboos?
Interestingly, almost all of the child molestation cases under Rule
414 involve family members, usually nieces or grandchildren.  This may
in part reflect the fact that Indians have more frequent and closer ties to
their extended families, many of whom live on the reservation.76 Some-
times, however, the tone of the opinion seems critical or mocking of the
intricate family connection.  For example in United States v. King, the
court wrote:
[The victim] considers Mr. King his uncle. In actuality,
Michael’s mother was once married to Mr. King’s
brother, who is now involved in a relationship with
Michael’s sister. Michael lives with his mother and one
series, Little House on the Prairie, by Laura Ingalls Wilder, portrays the Osage Indians as
dangerous and not entitled to the land on which the Ingalls family is squatting, in violation of a
treaty. See Rachel F. Seidman, This Little House of Mine, COMMON-PLACE, Apr., 2003, http://
www.common-place.org/vol-03/no-03/seidman/seidman-3.shtml (offering a nuanced analysis
of the racism in Wilder’s books).
75 See United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 39, 46 (1913) (describing Indians as “es-
sentially a simple, uninformed, and inferior people” and noting that “as a superior and civilized
nation [the U.S. has] the power and the duty of exercising a fostering care and protection over
all dependent Indian communities within its borders”) (cited in William Bradford, “With a
Very Great Blame on Our Hearts”:  Reparations, Reconciliation, and an American Indian
Plea for Peace with Justice, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 32 n.151); JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 21 (1996) (arguing that the trust doctrine is a “form of scien-
tific racism” that posits that whites have a duty to “wean native peoples from their ‘backward’
ways and to ‘civilize’ them”) (cited in Bradford, supra, at n.150); Robert N. Clinton, Re-
dressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for a Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 46
ARK. L. REV. 77, 131–32 (1993) (noting the Supreme Court’s justified extension of jurisdic-
tion over Indians by citing “the white man’s burden,” under which the federal government was
duty-bound to lead “its indigenous charges toward a more ‘enlightened’ way of life”).
76 See Jeanne Louise Carriere, Representing the Native American: Culture, Jurisdiction,
and the Indian Child Welfare Act, 79 IOWA L. REV. 585, 603 n.94 (1995) (“[T]he dynamics of
Indian extended families are largely misunderstood.  An Indian child may have scores of . . .
relatives who are counted as close, responsible members of the family.”) (quoting Indian Child
Welfare Program: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the H. Comm. on Inte-
rior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong. 18 (1974) (statement of William Byler, then-Executive
Director of the Association on American Indian Affairs)).
\\server05\productn\C\CJP\19-1\CJP104.txt unknown Seq: 18 15-JAN-10 15:12
190 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 19:173
of his brothers in one of five homes located in close
proximity to one another and occupied by Michael’s ex-
tended family.77
There is also some anecdotal evidence that courts portray Indian
families as dysfunctional, depicting the mother as failing to protect her
children.  For instance, in Unites States v. Seymour, the court observed:
“According to D.H. [mother of the victim], she did not report the rape
out of embarrassment, and she subsequently allowed Seymour to share a
bed with her daughter C.P. because she did not think that he would harm
her children.”78  The mother’s motivation for allowing Seymour to share
a bed with her child is irrelevant to the crime of child molestation, but is
representative of a blame-the-victim mentality.
Additionally, at least five cases include gratuitous references to the
mobile home or trailers in which events transpired or the accused or vic-
tim resides, and the courts thereby summon the image of the impover-
ished Indian reservation.79  Although poverty does not equal criminality,
the notion that only poor, uneducated people commit incest is en-
trenched.  Rule 413–414 evidence thus reinforces stereotypes about the
lives of Indians, and makes it harder to see the accuseds as unique
individuals.
A startling number of federal cases interpreting Rules 413–414 also
include information about the accused’s use of alcohol.  While there cer-
tainly is evidence that rape and child molestation correlates with addic-
tive behavior, such as alcoholism, and sometimes events relating to
alcohol are necessary to tell the story of the case,80 the focus on the
drunkenness of the Indian defendants is marked, and the effect is perni-
77 United States v. King, 221 F.3d 1353, No. 99-2363, 2000 WL 1028228, at *1 (10th
Cir. Jul. 26, 2000).
78 United States. v. Seymour, 468 F.3d 378, 382 (6th Cir. 2006).
79 See, e.g., United States v. Medicine Horn, 447 F.3d 620, 622 (8th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Norris, 428 F.3d 907, 910 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that the police substation was a
trailer); United States v. Velarde, 88 F. App’x 339, 340–41 (10th Cir. 2004) (mentioning
mobile home); King, 2000 WL 1028228, at *1 (mentioning trailer homes); United States v.
LeCompte, 131 F.3d 767, 768 (8th Cir. 1997) (same); United States v. Randolph Valentino
Kills in Water, 293 F.3d 432, 434 (8th Cir. 2002) (mentioning trailer in rape case on Indian
reservation); United States v. Ortiz, 125 F.3d 863, No. 96-CR-5, 1997 WL 608733, at *1 (10th
Cir. Oct. 3, 1997) (same).
80 Child molesters often live chaotic and shameful lives in which alcohol or drugs serve
as an escape.  Furthermore, alcohol can serve as a source of deniability—the perpetrator need
not admit that he was attracted to a child and instead claims that he was drunk and did not
know what he was doing.  Thanks to Jessica Hersch, MSW, LCSW, for this observation.  In
this regard, it is also particularly interesting that the Catholic Church has often sent sex-offend-
ing priests to treatment centers for alcohol and drug addiction. See generally Raymond C.
O’Brien, Clergy, Sex, and the American Way, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 363 (2004) (explaining the
Church’s support and assistance to priests through treatment at alcohol and drug rehabilitation
centers).  Furthermore, a Westlaw search for alcohol in state sex crime cases resulted in over
ten thousand hits.
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cious.81  In United States v. Medicine Horn, for example, the court re-
counted that the accused, Jerry Medicine Horn, “gathered at a building
on the powwow grounds to drink alcohol.”82  The court focused on the
fact that charged conduct and the prior uncharged offenses all alleged
that the accused procured alcohol for the minors he later molested.83
This commonality made the prior offense particularly probative.84
The Medicine Horn case also emphasized alcohol in another way:
one issue on appeal was the accused’s challenge to the District Court’s
jury instruction that voluntary intoxication is not a defense in sexual
abuse offenses.85  Medicine Horn objected that the instruction was faulty
and prejudicial because he never asserted intoxication as a defense; in-
stead, he denied sexual contact entirely.86  Medicine Horn claimed that
the instruction distracted the jury from his actual defense.87  The Eighth
Circuit court responded that “[b]ecause a considerable amount of evi-
dence was introduced at trial about Medicine Horn’s intoxicated state . . .
the District Court did not abuse its discretion by giving the intoxication
instruction.”88  The Eighth Circuit further observed:
Medicine Horn admitted that he was drinking heavily
during the party that preceded the assault.  He testified
that when he arrived at the Wade residence he was “buz-
zed” and that in the four hours before the attack, he con-
sumed six to eight twelve-ounce cans of beer, six
sixteen-ounce cans of beer, and shots from three differ-
ent bottles of liquor.89
The District Court’s instruction may not only have distracted the
jury, but may also have reminded the jurors and the judge of the stereo-
type of the drunken Indian.
It is often implied, if not explicitly stated, that it was not just the
perpetrator who had been drinking, but the victim or the negligent parent
as well.  Given the small number of Rule 414 cases, the evidence must
necessarily be anecdotal, but the chosen emphasis on alcohol and, in one
81 See, e.g., King, 2000 WL 1028228; United States v. McHorse, 179 F.3d 889, 894
(10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Withorn, 204 F.3d 790, 793 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Beaulieu, 194 F.3d 918, 919 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1429
(10th Cir. 1998).
82 Medicine Horn, 447 F.3d at 621.
83 See id. at 623.
84 See United States v. Medicine Horn, 447 F.3d 620, 623 (8th Cir. 2006).
85 Id. at 623–24.
86 See id. at 624.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
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case, gambling (a more modern association with Indians)90 displays in-
sensitivity, if not subtle bias.  Alcoholism is a serious social concern on
Indian reservations.91  Unfortunately, the firmly rooted stereotype in
American culture of the drunken Indian—one who swaps valuable land
for “fire-water”—is, in its own way, equally pernicious.92  The propen-
sity thinking that Rules 413–414 encourage seems particularly unfortu-
nate in light of the pre-existing stereotypes that white judges and jurors
may already possess concerning Indians.
An example of a blatant resort to negative stereotypes arose in Soap
v. Carter, a manslaughter case, in which, in the words of the dissent, the
prosecutor “‘summon[ed] that thirteenth juror, prejudice,’ to its side.”93
The prosecutor stated in the closing argument:
I believe the evidence shows that you have got a fel-
low—and it isn’t unusual—you know, it is sad to see,
but when you see an Indian that drinks liquor, you see a
man that can’t handle it.  There is just something about it
that they can’t manage it.  That’s what I say to you hap-
pened this particular night.94
The prosecutor made clear that it was not about just one “fellow,”
but about a “class of people” who could not change:
90 See United States v. Gabe, 237 F.3d 954, 957 (8th Cir. 2001) (highlighting a mother’s
bi-weekly bingo game, noting that when the mother was out gambling, the accused would prey
upon the children).
91 See Roger Clawson, The Alarming Increase in Alcohol-Damaged Children, THE AL-
ICE PATTERSON FOUNDATION, http://www.aliciapatterson.org/APF1302/Clawson/Clawson.html
(1990) (reporting that “[i]n a recent survey reported by the Indian Health Service, nearly 70
percent of Indian adults said they started drinking before they reached their teens . . . 33
percent of reservation youth 9 to 12 were regular drinkers[,]” and that Fetal Alcohol Syndrome
is a tremendous problem).
92 See Robert J. Miller & Maril Hazlett, “The Drunken Indian”: Myth Distilled into
Reality Through Federal Indian Alcohol Policy, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 223 (1996) (discussing ste-
reotypes concerning the myth of the drunken Indian); Alan R. Velie, Indian Identity in the
Nineties, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 189, 205 (1998) (“Today, white Americans cling to a
series of myths and misconceptions that Indians find very annoying. Both left and right in
America practice a form of condescension that is maddening to Indians. Bigots of the right
think of Indians as unemployed drunks. Those of the left evince no rancor, and in fact claim to
be ‘on the side of the Indians,’ yet when the subject of Indians arises, the first things they
mention are alcoholism and joblessness.”); James Falcon, Alcoholism, the Reservation, and the
Government, http://www.americanchronicle.com/-articles/1878 (Aug. 15, 2005) (“Along with
living in teepees, frequenting casinos, and scalping (and I don’t mean tickets to the Fighting
Sioux games), alcoholism has also become one of the many stereotypes that are forever etched
into the minds of many when they think about Native Americans.”).
93 Soap v. Carter, 632 F.2d 872, 877 (10th Cir. 1980) (Seymour, J., dissenting) (quoting
United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 659 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J.,
dissenting)).
94 Id. at 878.
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You try to impress upon people that they can change—
they should change, and there is a decent way of going
through life without violence, without committing
crimes and still you can enjoy life and obtain things and
goals in your life, but some people just don’t live that
way, and they won’t live that way.  That’s what you
have in this case.  You have a class of people and a situ-
ation that exists that you and I can’t change irrespective
of what we do.95
Amazingly, less than thirty years ago, a court tolerated these overt
prejudicial comments, with their appeal to negative stereotypes about In-
dians, and held that they did not violate due process.96  In this egregious
example, the prosecutor consciously summoned racial stereotypes to in-
sinuate guilt and to designate Indians as different.97
Understanding the power of stereotypes, which are pervasive in
human cognition, is crucial to understanding the fate of Indian accuseds,
facing the sexual propensity rules.  Stereotypes are embedded in our cul-
ture, perpetuated at home and at school.98  They are not consciously
evoked, and need not be overt to be effective.99  Psychologists explain
that stereotypes are cognitive tools that serve as energy-saving devices to
process information.100  They are evolutionarily adaptive shortcuts for
making sense of the world around us; they simplify the way we process
95 Id.
96 The majority in Soap held that the unobjected-to comments by the prosecutor “must
be considered in the context of the entire trial.  Those present at the Duncan home were all
Cherokees and had been drinking.  The claim of prejudice because of racial statements, em-
phasizes, out of all proportion, a minor incident in the trial to which no objection was made.”
Id. at 876.
97 See id.
98 See RUPERT BROWN, PREJUDICE: ITS SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 83 (Blackwell Publishing
1995) (discussing the theoretical origins of stereotype creation and development over time).
My research assistant, Elliot Anderson, reports that he was asked a bonus question on an
eighth grade Social Studies test concerning the biggest problem that has faced American Indi-
ans in the last three centuries.  He answered “colonization.”  The answer accepted as correct
was alcohol abuse.
99 See C. Neil Macrae, Alan B. Milne & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Stereotypes as Energy-
Saving Devices: A Peek Inside the Cognitive Toolbox, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
37, 44 (1994) (explaining that we use stereotypes even when we are not aware of doing so, and
preserve our attention capacity whether or not we perceive our reliance on “strategic deploy-
ment of stereotypical thinking . . . This executive function, moreover, is not simply a reflection
of deliberative, strategic processing.  It occurs in the absence of perceivers’ explicit intention
to instigate stereotype-based modes of thought.”).
100 See id. at 37.
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information.101  By contrast, individuation—seeing a person for the indi-
vidual he or she is—requires cognitive time and effort.102
People tend to rely on stereotypes more heavily when the demands
of their environment are more taxing and when they are cognitively
stressed.103  This explains why people are stubborn about challenging
their own stereotypes,104 and why “[s]tereotypes are notoriously difficult
to change.”105  People tend to discount information that contradicts their
preconceived notions.106
Not surprisingly, judges and jurors who are cognitively taxed by the
demands of the trial would seem to be particularly susceptible to uncon-
scious reliance on the shortcut of stereotypes.  Research suggests that the
use of stereotypes is quite likely when the determination of a person’s
guilt or innocence hangs in the balance.107  In trials, where the narrative
is often fractured, the evidence disjointed, and the available information
suboptimal, decision-makers apply stereotypes to simplify complex judg-
101 See id. at 4 (“[S]tereotyping is a functional, adaptive process that plays a central role
in human social cognition . . . .  Through stereotype application, perceivers can economize
cognition by managing the demands imposed on their processing capacity.”); see also STEVEN
PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE 201 (Viking 2002) (“[T]he brain evolved fallible yet intelligent
mechanisms that work to keep us in touch with aspects of reality that were relevant to the
survival and reproduction of our ancestors.”).  Sometimes stereotypes harm the one who
utilizes them, such as a boss who rejects the better job candidate or a landlord who rejects the
more reliable tenant, because of a stereotype. See Macrae, et al., supra note 99, at 44.  But, R
more often, the efficient, unconscious, automatic process is beneficial to the user, even if the
results are flawed.  See id. at 45 (“Through stereotype application, perceivers are able to derive
viable, although potentially erroneous, target-based impressions at very little cognitive cost.”).
Steven Pinker argues that stereotypes are not merely social constructs but have their roots in
evolutionarily adaptive categories based on observation, and hence, though not always accu-
rate, are not based on falsehood. See PINKER, supra, at 202–05.  I agree with Professor Brown
that even if stereotypes emerge from grains of truth, they may often, in the case of negative
stereotypes merely reflect socio-economic circumstances. See BROWN, supra note 98, at 84. R
Their origins or aggregate “truth” is less important than their function in harming individuals.
Id. Even Pinker concedes that the “partial accuracy of many stereotypes does not, of course,
mean that racism, sexism, and ethnic prejudice are acceptable.” PINKER, supra, at 205.
102 See Macrae et al., supra note 99, at 44 (“Individuation, in its many guises, is a rather R
time consuming and effortful affair.”) (citations omitted).
103 See id. at 37 (noting “increased reliance on stereotypes when social perception occurs
under taxing or resource-depleting conditions”).
104 In the words of Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, they are “reluctant, and at worst
incapable,” and will not do so without “critical cognitive and motivational criteria.” Id. at 44.
105 Ziva Kunda & Kathryn C. Oleson, Maintaining Stereotypes in the Face of Discon-
firmation: Constructing Grounds for Subtyping Deviants, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 565, 565 (1995).
106 When faced with disconfirming facts, individuals will tend to latch on to neutral infor-
mation to create a subtype within the stereotyped group to explain the difference (for instance,
distinguish women lawyers from all lawyers). See id. at 577.
107 See Ron Tamborini, Ren-He Huang, Dana Mastro & Reiko Nabashi-Nakahara, The
Influence of Race, Heuristics, and Information Load on Judgments of Guilt and Innocence, 58
COMM. STUD. 341, 341–42 (2007).
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ment tasks and to process information more easily.108  Other factors such
as time constraints, high volumes of information, ambiguity, and fatigue,
which are all aspects of the trial experience, can influence those facing
weighty legal determinations.109  As a result, the jurors may, consciously
or not, turn to the use of stereotypes in the process.110
Reliance on stereotypes in the courtroom is particularly harmful be-
cause our society seeks to mete out individual justice, not to reward or
punish group affiliation.  The presumption of innocence demands that
verdicts be uninhibited by the bonds of improper influence, but a juror’s
stereotypes may unfairly infect the judgment process.111  Procedural
safeguards are generally incapable of reducing the impact of stereotyping
by judges or jurors, particularly because such stereotypes are generally
not a topic for courtroom discussion and are not susceptible to witness
testimony or cross examination.112
In light of the cognitive ease into which all of us slip into stereotypi-
cal thinking, we must question the fairness of applying this relatively
new regime of Rules 413–414 to a discrete minority population.  We
must also examine the potential synergistic effect of societal stereotypes
about minorities and the impact of propensity evidence on the process of
proof.
Whether consciously prejudiced or not, finders of fact will already
have to overcome stereotypes about Indians.  The addition of another
form of propensity-thinking fostered by Rules 413–414 increases the un-
fairness.  The Indian accused, already traveling with the baggage of ste-
reotypes about his drunkenness, poverty, and uncivilized nature, is also
saddled with information about his propensity to commit similar sex of-
fenses.  These types of propensity thinking not only distract from the
particulars of the case at bar, but mutually reinforce each other.  The
accused receives a double whammy of prejudice that affects his chance
for acquittal and also, as this Essay will argue in Part III, has the poten-
tial to pave the way for judicial acceptance of and acclimation to Rules
413–414.
108 See id. at 342.
109 See id.; Roger Giner-Sorolla, Shelly Chaiken & Stacey Lutz, Validity Beliefs and Ide-
ology Can Influence Legal Case Judgments Differently, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 507, 508
(2002).
110 See Giner-Sorolla et al., supra note 109, at 508 (discussing a number of research R
studies completed on the effects and on the use of stereotypes in pseudo-legal environments).
111 See Carolyn Lown, Legal Approaches to Juror Stereotyping by Physical Characteris-
tics, 1 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 87, 92 (1977) (discussing perceived constitutional due process
violations that arise when juries use stereotypes to organize information and reach verdicts).
112 See id. But see Jody Armor, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Deci-
sionmakers Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L. REV. 733, 735 (1995) (suggesting jury
instructions that consciously mention race and sensitize the jury to the potential of bias in their
deliberations and verdict).
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C. Concern about Victims
In acknowledging the special hardships Indians have suffered, it is
also important to note that the victims in these cases are often Indian
women and children.  Professor Sarah Deer writes that sexual violence is
“one of the most devastating threats to contemporary indigenous cul-
ture.”113  In a special report, Amnesty International decries the severe
problems that Indian women face regarding sex crimes committed
against them.114  The report cites data from the Department of Justice
indicating that “Native American and Alaskan Native women are more
than 2.5 times more likely to be raped or sexually assaulted than women
in the USA generally.”115  The 2005 extension of the Violence Against
Women Act also highlighted the issue of violent assaults against Indian
women,116 including in its findings that “Indian tribes require additional
criminal justice and victim services resources to respond to violent as-
saults against women,”117 and “the unique legal relationship of the
United States to Indian tribes creates a Federal trust responsibility to as-
sist tribal governments in safeguarding the lives of Indian women.”118
The Amnesty report detailed the problems for Indian victims, in-
cluding a Byzantine maze of jurisdictional issues (state, federal, and tri-
bal jurisdictions with unclear jurisdictional demarcations among them
and officials all too happy to pass the buck).119  Also, Indian women are
subject to the same stereotypes as Indian men.  They are suspected of
113 Sarah Deer, Toward an Indigenous Jurisprudence of Rape, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 121, 121 (2004) (arguing that indigenous women have been “invisible in legal social
and historical discourse” about rape and suggesting the development of a rape jurisprudence
growing out of indigenous law and values).
114 See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT INDIGE-
NOUS WOMEN FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE USA (2007), http://www.amnestyusa.org/wo-
men/maze/report.pdf.
115 Id. at 2 (citing STEVEN W. PERRY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AMERICAN INDIANS AND
CRIME—A BJS STATISTICAL PROFILE 1992–2002 (2004), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.
gov/bjs/pub/pdf/aic02.pdf).  The Amnesty report observes that the estimate that more than one
in three Indians will be raped during her lifetime is probably artificially low given the ten-
dency of women not to report such sexual violence and the difficulty in collecting information
from women living in rural areas without telephone service.
116 Violence Against Women Act, Pub. L. No. 109-162, § 901, 119 Stat. 3077 (2006)
(finding that “Indian women experience 7 sexual assaults per 1,000, compared with 4 per
1,000 among Black Americans, 3 per 1,000 among Caucasians, 2 per 1,000 among Hispanic
women, and 1 per 1,000 among Asian women”).  The National Violence Against Women Sur-
vey reported that 34.1% of Indian women will be raped during their lifetime. See Deer, supra
note 113, at 123 (citing PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FULL R
REPORT ON THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
22 (2000)).
117 Violence Against Women Act, § 901.
118 Id.
119 Jurisdictional questions are complicated by the fact that tribal nations and the federal
government often have concurrent jurisdiction, though the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25
U.S.C. §§ 1301–03 (2006), restricts the punishments that tribal courts can impose, and the
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drinking and are assumed to have been responsible for the attack if they
consumed alcohol.120
Even if Indian women are disproportionately victims of sexual as-
sault, they do not deserve the “protections” of Rules 413–414 if those
evidence rules are unfair and are applied invidiously.  Further, Rules
413–414 may negatively impact Indian women and children in at least
two respects.  First, the rules perpetuate stereotypes that are bad for all
Indians, including women and children.  Indian victims may be legiti-
mately concerned about the application of a facially neutral rule that re-
lies on and furthers negative stereotypes about their own people.
Ironically, Indian woman and children who testify about being victims of
sex crimes are placed in the position of simultaneously seeking justice
and participating in the process of demonizing and stereotyping their
own people.121  Likewise, in arguing for the development of an indige-
nous jurisprudence of rape, Professor Deer recognizes the importance of
cultural affiliation for Indian women and observes that “[a] woman’s
ability to seek justice in her own community may facilitate healing and
emotional wellness.”122
Second, the existence of these rules may have a boomerang effect
and actually cause fewer cases to be brought on behalf of Indian victims.
The Amnesty report complained that prosecutions of sex crimes are in-
frequent in Indian Country.123  In part, the problem stems from jurisdic-
tional overlaps where it is unclear whether state, Indian, or federal law
applies and, as a result, nobody prosecutes.124  However, according to
United States Supreme Court has held that tribal nations have no criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indian accuseds. See Deer, supra note 113, at 127–28. R
120 See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 114, at 47.  It is a common phenomenon to R
blame the victim, charging that the rape was the result of her incautious behavior.  She is
disbelieved or the harm to her is discounted if she consumed alcohol. See Mary I. Coombs,
Telling the Victim’s Story, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 277, 283 (discussing how provocative dress
or consumption of alcohol triggers rape myths); cf. United States v. Benais, 460 F.3d 1059,
1060–61 (8th Cir. 2006) (stating that the accused plied fourteen year old with liquor, raped her
when she passed out and “told her that what had happened was her fault”).
121 The obvious analog is the reaction of Black women to rape trials that rely on racist
stereotypes but are intended to protect Black women. See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, Patriarchal
Stories I: Cultural Rape Narratives in the Courtroom, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD.
387, 481–87 (1996).  Thanks to my student, David Lundeen, of Indiana University Maurer
School of Law, for raising this point.
122 Deer, supra note 113, at 126. R
123 See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 114, at 61–62. R
124 See id. Additionally, a partial explanation derives from the post 9/11 transformation
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which has caused the FBI to adopt new responsi-
bilities and to see its mission expressed in terms of global rather than individual crimes. See
id. at 43 (“A federal prosecutor told Amnesty International that the FBI was ‘spread really thin
since 9/11.’”). See generally Federal Bureau of Investigation, Our Post 9/11 Transformation,
http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/transformation.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2009) (describing the
changes at the FBI since 9/11 as such, “[W]e’ve realigned our structure, created new capabili-
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Amnesty, even when jurisdiction is clear, federal prosecutors seem reluc-
tant to prosecute.125  As the organization reports, “a widespread percep-
tion exists among those working on sexual violence and other issues
affecting Native Americans in Oklahoma that cases are frequently de-
clined for prosecution and that federal prosecutors are unlikely to take a
case unless a conviction is virtually guaranteed.”126
Although it is true that Rules 413–414 make prosecution easier
when the accused has a sexual wrong in his history, they may, ironically,
make cases without such propensity evidence even less desirable to try.
Prosecutors may essentially wait until the accused has at least one other
accusation (whether charged or not) to make the case easier.  Therefore,
one practical effect of Rules 413–414 may be to discredit the victims
who bring first-time charges.  For a case of rape or child molestation to
be taken seriously, the prosecutor may require evidence of at least one
other person who had a similar experience with the accused to corrobo-
rate the victim’s story and to strengthen the prosecution of the case.
Hence, when applying Rules 413–414, a single victim represents a data
point, not a crime, and sex offenders who are not recidivists and do not
fit the stereotype of the mad rapist or the out-of-control pedophile will
not be prosecuted.
III. HOW THE OVERREPRESENTATION OF INDIANS IN FEDERAL SEX-
CRIME CASES MAY SUBTLY REINFORCE THE SWAY
OF PROPENSITY THINKING
I posit that Rules 413–414 damage not only Indians, but also the
law of evidence itself.  The over-representation of Indians in the bur-
geoning caselaw may have subtly promoted judicial acceptance of these
otherwise objectionable, non-traditional rules.  Jurors in federal cases,
who are drawn from a wide pool and are unlikely to be Indians them-
selves, are susceptible to negative stereotypes about Indians that correlate
with propensity arguments and influence the determination of guilt.  Fur-
thermore, I think that the standard objections to Rules 413–414 prove
particularly salient in cases involving an accused Indian, who may be
perceived as strange or exotic.  Jurors may overvalue the probative value
of prior bad-act evidence and may use the evidence of prior sex crimes to
punish the accused for past misdeeds or for being a terrible person.  They
may be tempted to abandon the presumption of innocence and may con-
ties, hired different talents, and shifted more personnel into intelligence and terrorism opera-
tions—all to meet our now overriding priority to protect the U.S. from terrorist attacks.”).
125 See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 114, at 66 (federal prosecutors “may be R
applying overly stringent criteria for selecting cases for prosecution”).
126 Id. at 67; see also id. at 42–43 (discussing the failure of the FBI to investigate sex
crimes against Indian women and their reluctance to spend resources, particularly post-9/11,
on such matters).
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vict even when there is reasonable doubt—asking themselves why a per-
petrator of past horrible sex crimes walks free.  Jurors are ill-equipped to
handle such challenges in the face of overwhelming information about
the accused’s past sex crimes.
Nevertheless, my focus here is on judges rather than juries.
Whatever damage stereotypes about Indians or information about past
sex acts may inflict in individual cases against individual accuseds, ju-
rors are not repeat players.  They do not directly screen the evidence.
Instead, they work with what the judge allows them to hear and, thus,
their contribution in shaping law is attenuated at best.  Jurors have little
formal role in measuring the fairness of the evidence; they consider only
its relevance, utility, and persuasiveness.
Judges, on the other hand, not only apply but create the rules of
evidence on the ground.  True, Congress passed Rules 413–414, and
judges, even if they are persuaded by the arguments of law professors
and civil libertarians that these rules are wrong, cannot simply ignore
them.  But, as I have argued elsewhere, the judge’s role as gatekeeper
under Rule 403 can play a major role in the practical operation of these
rules.127  Under Rule 403, judges must balance the probative value of the
evidence against potential harms—such as unfair prejudice, distraction,
and potential confusion of the prior bad sex acts—against the probative
value of such evidence.  In conducting this crucial Rule 403 balance,
judges may be subtly and even unconsciously influenced by the nature of
and their attitudes toward the population of the accuseds.
The status of the Indian as a savage “other” might affect acceptance
of a doctrine that constructs and applies notions of propensity.  The pro-
pensity argument, which is anathema to the long traditions of Anglo-
American common law, may seem more intuitively appealing to a judge
who is exclusively exposed to one small sub-population of accuseds
whom he perceives as very different from himself—poor, drunken, sav-
age, and uncivilized.
Relying on stereotypes (whether consciously or not) in justifying
propensity rules, therefore, not only hurts the accused individually and
Indians as a group, but also damages our system of justice.  If judges
have preconceptions of Indians as drunken savages, propensity evidence
may further reinforce these unconscious negative images and expand the
stereotype to include child molesters and rapists.  Information that the
accused was a sexual predator in the past may subtly encourage judges to
rely on stereotypes and see such group-identity categories as particularly
valid.  As a consequence, the stereotype and the propensity rules become
127 See Orenstein, Deviance, Due Process, supra note 28, at 1549–57. R
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mutually reinforcing.128  Hence, judges themselves may overestimate the
probative value of prior bad acts by the accused and underestimate the
unfair prejudice arising from knowledge of those bad acts.
The concern that judges may overestimate the probative value of
prior sex offenses dovetails with the chief policy explanation for the sex-
ual propensity rules and the main justification for the departure from the
traditional ban on using prior bad acts for propensity.  As the author of
Rules 413–414 clearly indicated, the impetus for the rules stemmed from
the belief that there are discrete pockets of deviant individuals in Ameri-
can society who have predatory propensities that are so unique and recid-
ivist that the propensity rules are particularly probative.129  Senator Bob
Dole, a chief sponsor of Rules 413–414, remarked: “In child molestation
cases, for example, a history of similar acts tends to be exceptionally
probative because it shows an unusual disposition of the defendant . . .
that simply does not exist in ordinary people.”130  The theory is that such
perpetrators are significantly different from the rest of society.  The na-
ture of their past offenses and their extreme deviance set them apart in
ways that make propensity arguments in sex cases highly relevant and
much more persuasive than other types of prior bad acts.
By focusing on American Indians, Catholic priests,131 or any other
small, non-mainstream group, one may reinforce the myth that only cer-
tain people or groups commit sex crimes because of their odd culture or
deviant proclivities.  By its repetitive focus on one small subgroup, the
caselaw may reinforce the notion that there is a “type” of person or series
of character traits that are inexorably linked to rape or child abuse.  This
conclusion both overstates what psychology tells us about sexual vio-
lence and creates the illusion that such abuse is not a general problem
among all segments of society.132  Because, outside of the military, the
128 See Armor, supra note 112, at 750–72 (discussing the psychological and cognitive R
mechanism by which stereotypes are reinforced).
129 David Karp, author and chief promoter of Rules 413–414 in the Department of Justice
observed: “Ordinary people do not commit outrages.” David J. Karp, Evidence of Propensity
and Probability in Sex Offense Cases and Other Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 15, 20 (1994);
see also Orenstein, No Bad Men! supra note 4, at 691 (“Rule 413 assumes that some facet of a R
rapist’s character exists that makes him not only a recidivist, but particularly aberrational and
dangerous.”).
130 140 CONG. REC. S12990 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1994) (statement of Sen. Dole); see also
140 CONG. REC. H2433 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari) (same).
131 Though Catholic priests are clearly not singled out for special jurisdiction or punish-
ment, their status as a discrete and different group makes it easier to construe the problem of
sex abuse as arising only from small segments of society.
132 Although child abusers and rapists may have some identifiable character traits (failure
of empathy), cognitive lapses (sincere belief that victim enjoys unwanted sexual attention), and
employ similar modus operandi (gaining trust of lonely individuals, leading a youth group),
one cannot spot a sexual predator.  They come from all races, ethnicities, religions, and socio-
economic backgrounds (hence the next-door-neighbor’s shock when interviewed on televi-
sion). See ELI COLEMAN, S. MARGRETTA DWYER, & NATHANIEL J. PALLONE, SEX OFFENDER
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federal jurisdiction of rape and child molestation cases restricts the pool
of defendants to the exotic, uncivilized, drunken Indian “other,” the cog-
nitive construct and theoretical justification of the new evidence rules
seem vindicated.  Another drunken Indian abuses a child on a reserva-
tion?  Another Indian woman is raped?  Clearly, thinks the judge who is
performing the Rule 403 balancing test in these cases, this propensity
theory makes some sense!  The facts of rape or molestation cases involv-
ing Indian plaintiffs or defendants seem so similar that there appears to
be a template for certain sex crimes.  Hence, a supposed predictable pro-
file of the abuser emerges in the judge’s mind.  In such a context, the use
of propensity evidence may seem more justifiable and less troubling to
the trial judge, despite the historic ban on such evidence.
It is outside the scope of this Essay to consider the very different set
of concerns that arise among the soldiers accused of sexual offenses in
military cases.  I hope that others will consider these cases in depth be-
cause they provide a wealth of information about the rules themselves,
stereotypes about warriors, and military culture.  Overall, the military
courts seem slightly more reluctant to admit evidence on the grounds of
the new rules, more skeptical in their belief that the past offenses actually
occurred, and more rigorous in their application of Rule 403133 (though if
my conversations with military defenders are any indication, that is not
saying much).  The explanation for the differences, although many-fac-
eted, seems to depend on the fact that the military caseload differs from
the nature of the caseload that arises in Indian Country.  Generally, most
Indian cases involve child molestation, while most military cases involve
rape.134
Some, but certainly not all, of the military cases seem markedly
hostile to the application of Rule 413, and skeptical in their belief of
statements made by the victim in the case at issue and the accused’s
alleged former victims.  In sifting through the probative value of the
prior-act evidence, some military cases are startling in their reliance on
TREATMENT: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND MEDICAL APPROACHES 68, 118 (1992) (stating that demo-
graphic diversity of pedophiles supports the conclusion that “pedophiles are as different as
they are alike”); id. (supplying data on the variability of demographic and socio-economic
backgrounds of pedophiles); see also AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC
AND STATISTICAL MANUEL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 566-68 (4th ed. Text Revision, 2000) (not-
ing that cultural and religious variations in sexual norms make it difficult to make statements
on the frequency of paraphilias across cultures, except that most paraphilias are very rare in
women).
133 See, e.g., United States v. Berry, 61 M.J. 91, 95 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (holding that evi-
dence of prior consensual sodomy was wrongfully admitted where in the prior case, the ac-
cused and the victim were both minors, and in the case at issue both the accused and the victim
were adults, because the trial judge did not conduct a thorough Rule 403 balancing test).
134 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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rape myths and misogynistic attitudes.135  This lack of respect for the
women who testify about the alleged offenses (both the charged offenses
and prior sexual offenses offered under Rule 413) arguably correlates
with the negative attitudes towards women that often arise in a male-
dominated, warrior culture.  Such bias is particularly acute where the vic-
tim is not a soldier, though it is clearly moderated when the victim is a
member of the military and not an “other.”136  Of equal importance is
that military courts tend to apply the Rule 403 balancing test more
rigorously.137
Moreover, the issue of “otherness” makes for an interesting compar-
ison between the Indian cases and the military ones.  Read broadly, all of
these cases indicate that acceptance of propensity thinking correlates
with the perception of the accused.  Whereas we all see ourselves as indi-
viduals despite our cultural, ethnic, gender, racial, or religious affiliation,
it is harder to see others that way, and harder still if the others whom we
are asked to judge are perceived as very different from ourselves.  The
logic of propensity thinking is most persuasive when group characteris-
tics dominate the judge’s method of organizing his thoughts about the
accused.
The restricted defendant pool and the repetitive fact patterns may
explain the growth and judicial acceptance of Rules 413–414.  Trial
court judges, who serve as evidence gatekeepers and whose sensibilities
must be engaged to identify and limit unfair prejudice under Rule 403,
may be subtly influenced by disproportionate representation of Indians in
the federal sex-crime caseload.  The concentration of alleged federal sex-
crime offenders in Indian Country, as the locus for almost all the non-
military cases, has skewed the population of the accused and may have
affected judges’ willingness to engage in propensity-like thinking.  I hy-
135 See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 54 M.J. 700, 708 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2001) (“In
addition to KD’s credibility problem, her description of how she manifested her lack of con-
sent during the second rape raises a substantial question whether a reasonable person would
have perceived her nonconsent under the circumstances.  In our judgment, her assertion that
she did not consent to sexual intercourse during the second rape is not convincing.  KD testi-
fied that she tried to fight the appellant, but he was pulling her hair ‘real bad,’ so ‘I didn’t fight
much; I was too afraid.’  Without providing any other details on how she manifested her
nonconsent to the appellant, KD testified as conclusions that she did not consent and that the
appellant forcibly sodomized her, pulled her pubic hair to maintain control of her, and pene-
trated her vaginally.  Under these facts, we are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that
the appellant did not mistakenly believe that KD consented to sexual intercourse and
sodomy.”).
136 Cf. United States v. Sentance, No. ACM 34693, 2004 WL 190075, at *5 (A.F. Ct.
Crim. App. Jan. 7, 2004) (“The offenses are further aggravated by the fact that the victims
were fellow service members and the crimes occurred on military installations.”).
137 See Orenstein, Deviance, Due Process, supra note 28, at 1510; see, e.g., United States R
v. Dewrell, 55 M.J. 131, 138 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (“The military [trial] judge’s careful and rea-
soned analysis on the record satisfied the constitutional requirement that evidence offered
under Rule 413 be subjected to a thorough balancing test pursuant to Mil. R. Evid. 403.”).
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pothesize that recurring fact patterns that involve the same sub-popula-
tions reinforce a cognitive loop.  The otherwise jarring notion of
propensity evidence seems more just—or at least more justified—in light
of the repetitive fact patterns the judges observe in their courtrooms.
In sum, not only do Rules 413–414 rely upon propensity and poten-
tially perpetuate stereotypes about Indians, but their jurisdictional limita-
tion to Indian Country may subtly influence the acceptance,
development, and application of the rules.  Indeed, I hypothesize that the
concentrated application of Rules 413–414 in Indian Country, with Indi-
ans as the regulars at the defense table, may reinforce the perceived value
of propensity evidence.  Indians, the quintessential “savage” outsiders,
are not only easily susceptible to demonization, but their regular appear-
ance as accuseds in federal court may give credence to the use of propen-
sity evidence and may reinforce the appearance that the propensity
theory is grounded in common sense.  This paves the way for eventual
acceptance of a new, dangerous doctrine.
For the judge, such thinking may be part of an unconscious cogni-
tive shortcut that is helpful for ruling on a Rule 403 motion.  Most of the
costs fall on the person who has been historically stereotyped—the one
who, in the case of sex crimes, is perceived as more strange, savage, or
intoxicated and, hence, more likely to have committed the crime.  Fur-
thermore, unlike interpersonal interactions, which only affect individuals,
stereotypes in the courtroom damage the judicial system’s ability to de-
liver justice.
CONCLUSION
The Indian population presents a regrettable target for the launch of
controversial and anti-accused character rules.  Even though Rules
413–414 raise no technical equal protection problem, they create serious
legal and social issues because of the targeted populations upon whom
the brunt of the rules falls: Indians, soldiers, and the occasional person
taking a minor across states lines for illicit purposes.  Propensity evi-
dence about Indian accuseds causes extra harm because it relies upon and
perpetuates negative stereotypes about Indians.  Revealingly, in United
States. v. Koruh, the court reported that the accused “took the stand and
denied that he had sexual contact with either of his nieces.  He testified
that Jane Doe B had been sexually abused but that the abuse was by
another Indian.”138  With such limited jurisdiction (outside of the mili-
tary) it stands to reason that the child molester had to be “another In-
dian,” not just another person.
138 United States v. Koruh, 210 F.3d 390, No. 99-2138, 2000 WL 342252, at *1 (10th Cir.
Apr. 3, 2000) (summarizing, not quoting the accused’s testimony).
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Equally important, the concentrated application of Rules 413–414 in
Indian Country, and their focus on Indian accuseds, may have eased judi-
cial acceptance of the new rules.  Rules 413–414 are premised on the
notion that centuries of traditional thought regarding evidence should be
abandoned.  They rest on the idea that rapists and child molesters are
deviant and inherently different from the rest of us—so much so that
rules of propensity have particular force, overcoming evidence law’s
traditional wariness of admitting character evidence.  How much easier it
is to accept this premise when the accuseds all hale from a discrete mi-
nority that is stereotyped as drunken, savage, and uncivilized.
